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African borders today resulted from European colonial efforts during the 19th and 20th
centuries. The nations, separated largely by the physical features of the land, cut across ethnic
ties and divided ancient tribal communities. In many regions of the African continent, these new
borders split powerful tribes making them minorities in the newly formed nations. In the process
of decolonization, political allegiance often paralleled strict ethnic associations and the idea of
self determination provoked movements in many parts of the continent. This universal right for
people to determine their future political status has frequently brought conflict. With the United
Nations’ strict limitations surrounding self determination and the many external interests that
remained after the colonial period, communities in the process of self determination faced large
barriers that often reinforced the authority of the European constructed borders. A 1963 decision
by the Organization of African Unity recognized colonial borders as the basis of independent
state borders, disregarding the ethnic and tribal separations formed by such boundaries.1 This
declaration presented more difficulties to those attempting self determination. In the newly
formed Republic of Congo, the Katanga province’s quest for self determination was an attempt
to reconstruct a powerful tribe turned ethnic minority. Although undeniably shaped by external
powers, indigenous leaders, specifically Moise Tshombe, spurred the Katanga secessionist
movement by asserting an autochthonous identity as the foundation of their claim to statehood
and forging alliances with powerful white settlers. Although unsuccessful in seccession, this
pronouncement negated the efforts of Patrice Lumumba’s central government to create a unified
Congo by strengthening ethnic authority in the richest province in the Congo Basin.
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Beginning in the late 1800s, the Congolese people sustained a series of oppressive
governments, often prioritizing wealth over the good of the common people. King Leopold II of
Belgium united the Congo basin in 1885, including two hundred fifty ethnic groups previously
belonging to chieftain-kingdoms.2 Leopold named this region Etat Independant du Congo or
Congo Free State (CFS), instigating forced labor policies to exploit the Congo’s wide array of
natural resources, including rubber, ivory, and minerals such as copper, diamonds, gold, uranium
(for nuclear technology), niobium, and tantalum (for space aeronautics).3 Katanga, the most
economically important and minerally rich province of the newly formed CFS, faced the biggest
changes.
Previously controlled by the powerful Lunda-Bayeke kingdom, colonizers swiftly
dissolved this empire’s rule, dividing the kingdom into three different regions: the Katangese
province, parts of Angola, and Northern Rhodesia.4 Once a robust political and military empire
feared for three hundred years from the Kasai highlands to Angola,5 the Lunda empire was
conquered by a small yet powerful tribe of warriors known as the Bayeke. This tribe, led by
Chief Msiri, migrated into the Lunda area of Tanganyika and overthrew the emperor, Mwata
Yamo III.6 In 1891, with the arrival of King Leopold II, a Belgian lieutenant killed Msiri in order
to solidify European power in the province. Belgium rule in Katanga brought a significant
emphasis on education and infrastructure but neglected any initiation of economic and social
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development within the region, instead, the colonists focused on “export-oriented economic
activity.”7 The Belgians initiated major limitations on internal travel for Katangese people and a
ban on political parties or alliances,8 attempting to control their newfound population. These
measures inadvertently created isolated communities based on ethnic associations. In the 1960s,
during “the rapid process of decolonisation,” a majority of political parties sprouted from deeply
loyal ethnic communities, dividing the region’s political landscape into a fight for ethnic
dominance.9
Accounting for just 13% of the total population of CFS across a large expanse of land,
Katanga’s mineral resources were easily subject to human exploitation. Due to Katanga’s sparse
indigenous population, large corporations fueled mass migrations of Baluba Kasaian peoples to
urban Katangese centers to bolster the workforce. The growing political mobilization of these
“foreigners” worried many Katangese elites. In 1957, Kasaian migrants made up 22% of the
population compared to 6.3% Lunda population.10 Furthermore, during the 1957 elections in
Elisabethville, the economic center of Katanga, the four elected chief magistrates were all from
non-indigenous ethnicities.11 Desperately seeking the preservation of their power, Lunda elites
established Groupement des Associations de L’Empire, 12 linking “contemporary political
expression to powerful pre-colonial identities.”13 Gassomel proved ineffective in establishing
political success in the new democratic environment due to the increasingly small Lunda
population. In realizing this, an alliance of indigenous elites across the Katanga province created
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the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga.14 The leaders of Conakat, most notably
Moise Tshombe, created an organization that simultaneously aligned itself with settler and
mining interests while also remaining critical of the migration that supported the mining
workforce.15 The organization united most ethnic identities of the region, drawing power from
their alliance with colonial institutions.
Efforts for political dominance by Conakat were interrupted in 1960 with the sudden
news of an impending political independence for the Congolese. Patrice Lumumba, a member of
the Congolese resistance, was elected on June 23, 1960 as “the first democratically elected prime
minister” of the post-independence government.16 Lumumba had pioneered Congolese
nationalistic ideals, consistently advocating for “uncompromised self determination,” and
organizing democratic protests challenging Belgium for independent rule.17 He called for
complete national unity, disregarding the great diversity present in the Congo Basin and
threatening the powers that tribal chiefs had over their communities. In a speech at the 1961
All-African Conference in Leopoldville, Lumumba championed independence declaring,
“We were aware that as long as the country was dependent, as long as she did not take
her destiny into her own hands, the main thing would be lacking [...] We have declared
our desire for speedy independence without a transition period and without compromises
with such emphasis because we have suffered more mockery, insults and humiliation
than anybody else. What purpose could delays serve when we already knew that sooner
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or later we would have to revise and re-examine everything? We had to create a new
system adapted to the requirements of purely African evolution, change the methods
forced on us and, in particular, find ourselves and free ourselves from the mental attitudes
and various complexes in which colonisation kept us for centuries. We were offered a
choice between liberation and the continuation of bondage. There can be no compromise
between freedom and slavery. We chose to pay the price of freedom.”18
His administration planned to increase taxation from 20% of receipts to 50% of receipts and to
buy all shares of Katanga enterprises held by the Belgian government.19 These decisions were an
attempt for greater autonomy and not unlike the neighboring taxation of 80% of receipts in
Northern Rhodesian government coffers, a minerally rich area similar to Katanga.20 These
limitations imposed on free enterprise alongside Lumumba’s controversial ethnic beliefs and aim
for a unitary government, ensured an array of opponents in the Katanga province who viewed
Lumumba as a radicalist. Lumumba’s election threatened Katangese elite, many of whom had
strong ties to western powers, inciting fears of losing control of Katanga’s parliament. Tshombe
consistently criticized Lumumba’s character and political ideals, calling him “an erratic
demagogue.”21 In 1960 amidst a crisis in the capital city after the mutiny of Lumumba’s troops,
Moise Tshombe declared Katanga’s independence from the Congo, eleven days after Congo’s
independence from Belgium, accusing the central government of communist leanings.
Without a stable military force, the capital of Leopoldville fell into turmoil leaving no
options for engaging with the Katangese secession. Patrice Lumumba appealed to the United
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Nations but only received support to restore the capital area. He then appealed to the United
States but the state department denied his request believing Lumumba exhibited communist
ideals.22 Without Katanga, 50% of the Congo revenue disappeared.23 Out of desperation,
Lumumba requested aid from the Soviet Union to pacify the Katanga secession in August, 1960.
The Soviet Union gave the Congo four planes full of military supplies.24 This move provided
justification for western powers to assist in the removal of Lumumba from power. On September
14, 1960, Joseph Mobutu overthrew Lumumba in a coup d’etat, sending him to Elizabethville
where he was tortured and executed in January of the following year.25 With ethnic associations
on the forefront of people’s mind, Godefroid Munongo and Moise Tshombe formed an alliance
in an an attempt to reconstitute the Lunda-Bayeke empire as Katanga’s driving political force.
Tshombe had married the daughter of a Lunda king and Munongo had close ancestral ties to the
Bayeke leadership, together their alliances and contemporary roles in politics ensured support
and resources.26 Munongo became commander of the newly formed Katanga secret police which
employed many Belgian officers and mercenaries. After secession, he imprisoned the entire
Katanga parliamentary opposition.27 The total number of government officials is still unknown
though the police released 950 former parliamentary members in June, 1961.28 Moise Tshombe’s
partnerships with a powerful array of entities including UK and Belgium government officials,
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mining companies, settlers, mercenaries, and Lunda-Bayeke tribal members, ensured his
leadership tactics would not hinder the secession’s success.29
Moise Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo asserted an indigenous ethnic identity as the
basis of their claim to statehood. Fueled by the economic and political change brought by
Belgian colonists, along with the assertion of power made by non-indigenous peoples, Katangese
elite viewed the secession as a means to reinstate indigenous control. Founding a secessionist
government on the ideals of the pre-colonial Lunda kingdom brought a unified history to a
community seemingly unconnected while simultaneously connecting the elite to more
impoverished masses. Godefroid Munongo and Moise Tshombe’s alliance exemplifies this
attempt for historical interconnection, considering that both men often disagreed about the
correct role of external powers in Katanga’s economy and government. In the summer of 1961,
Munongo, sensing irrevocable tensions between Katanga and Belgium, publicly appealed to the
Soviet Union for help. In that same statement, he called for an alliance with Antoine Gizenga,
leader of the central government in Stanleyville, from which the two most powerful provinces
could form a common front against Leopoldville.30 Tshombe retracted the appeal shortly after,
attempting to maintain western support for the secession. Despite their differences, Moise
Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo attempted to reconstruct the alliance between the Lunda and
Bayeke tribes. Interestingly, they undertook these efforts while “express[ing] reservations about
the idea that chiefs should be granted any exorbitant prerogatives.”31 Instead, Katangese elite
forged the alliance while precariously balancing the amount of power delegated to the chiefs of
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the tribes in question. Facing Luba rebel fighting on the North border, “the chiefs were too
essential to the internal order and security of the beleaguered state to be pacified with titles and
trinkets.”32 Instead, chiefs were given ambiguous authorities and promised “a share of executive
power at the local level,” a promise that never fully came to fruition.33 Hoping to maintain a civil
government, Tshombe and Munongo spread this autochthonous identity through public and
media space, calling for chiefs to extend support for the secession as well.
This emphasis on ethnic loyalty, although a basis for unification, also alienated other
powers in the region. The initial threat posed by Kasain immigrants strengthened after secession
as “the presence of ‘alien’ elements whose language, customs, and traditions differed
considerably from those of the resident tribes [had] made them all the more conscious of their
mutual differences.”34 Previous election results had revealed the distinctive tribal groupings and
reinforced their solidarity. In 1959 Conakat’s increasingly xenophobic attitude created serious
internal stresses for the party.35 When Conakat declared its support of a Katangese government
approportioned by “authentic Katangese,”36 the Association des Baluba du Katanga (Balubakat)
withdrew from the party. The change was “indicative of the ethnic solidarity prevailing among
the Baluba: if substantial cultural differences existed between the Kasain tribes and those of the
Katanga, they are at any rate not so fundamental as to leave each indifferent to the other’s fate.”37
In instances such as this, ethnicity serves as both a unifying and dividing force, precariously
balancing peace and conflict. This competition between the Conakat and Balubakat, both major
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constituent units, accelerated with the emergence of electoral campaigns, sometimes ending in
bloodshed. The political and social changes aligning with new democratic institutions tightened
ethnic association, causing “alternative ‘autochthony’/’allochthony’ dichotomies.”38 These
increases of such dichotomies paralleling autochthonous or allochthonous principles distinctly
manifested itself in the election results of June 1959. After first predicted to equal one another,
unforeseen events skewed the parliamentary seat election results in Conakat’s favor.39 Balubakat
members claimed they were victims of election fraud, exasperating already tense relations.40
When Tshombe declared a Katanga secession, Jason Sendwe, the leader of the Balubakat party,
retaliated by formally recognizing the Lumumba administration. This recognition provided the
basis for the region to challenge the secessionist regime, declaring an independent “Province of
Lualaba” in October 1960. The new state formed an alliance with Stanleyville Lumumbists and
Tshombe was made to recognize the loss of northern and central Katanga.41
The tendency to identify ethnic loyalties in political allegiance was also aggravated by
the presence of a politically conscious settler community, often allying themselves with the
native Lunda and Bayeke leaders. Undoubtedly, the Katanga secession “benefited powerfully
during its initial period from crucial military and technical assistance extended by Belgium.”42
Moise Tshombe’s strategically placed partnerships with both Belgian settlers and mercenaries
ensured broader economic and political gains towards Tshombe’s career. Even after the UN
deported all mercenaries in Katanga, white settlers supplied Tshombe with military leadership in
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exchange for the preservation of their privileges, rather than a unified Congo.43 This partnership
allowed a strong military power to emerge in Katanga, solidifying efforts for maintained
autonomy.
Moise Tshombe excelled in his manipulation of multiple entities to secure wealth and
prestige during the Katanga secession, playing on already tense ethnic associations and revealing
himself as an independent agent. Both historians and Tshombe’s contemporary counterparts
simply viewed him as a puppet for foreign powers to use. Lumumba once said, “Tshombe is
simply an instrument of the Belgians,” yet research implies a firm awareness of global relations.
This orthodox perspective undoubtedly promoted the destruction of Lumumba’s career in
establishing powerful enemies with strong internal goals. Conakat’s accumulation of power
throughout Katanga did not signify a reconstruction of the Lunda-Bayeke empire but rather the
increase of wealth and prestige for the Tshombe family. While colonial powers may have
provided extra monetary support, especially when threatened by the nationalistic ideals of
Lumumba’s administration, Tshombe sought a secession in hopes of establishing personal power
in a minerally rich region in the heart of Africa. Tshombe clearly distinguishes a beneficial
partnership from one that exploits him in leadership. In March of 1960, Tshombe exploded at the
Conakat Executive Council meeting asserting “... that he no longer intended to be for sale to the
settlers. ‘These gentlemen have collected much money in Conakat’s name. They have made
themselves the keepers of our money… The financial situation is in the hands of the settlers; the
breach must be clear and even brusque.’”44 Having firmly established relationships with
European government officials, large local corporations, and the settler population, these
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loyalties did not prevent Tshombe from compromising his own political agenda. The
Lunda-Bayeke alliance for recreating a historical empire merely veiled Tshombe’s plans of
increased domination.
Considering the United Nations requirements to achieve autonomy based on
self-determination, Katangese authorities failed to create an adequate governing body. “‘The
freedom of the people of the territory to choose the form of government which they desire,’ and
‘freedom from interference by another government as to internal affairs’ are essential”45
components of establishing an independent will of the people. One must also consider the
general welfare of the Katangese involved and “the economic deprivations entailed by the
secession.” Such insecurities risked the entire survival of many Katangese communities, clearly
failing to meet the requirements of self-determination.46 Even more prevalent was the threat of
global consequence if the Congo’s four separate governments each attained autonomy. Caught
up in the politics of the cold war, The USSR openly backed the Stanleyville government led by
Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba’s deputy prime minister of the new Republic of Congo, since the
Parti Solidaire Africain appealed to a modern idea of governance by crossing ethnic loyalties.
With this support, it was possible for Gizenga to create a viable state. “From the standpoint of
the internal political situation in the Congo, the secession would have played directly into the
hands of the Gizangists and perhaps have invited a much firmer ‘commitment’ on their part than
presently exist[ed], thereby making the prospects of national unification all the more distant.”47
Each of these factors led the United Nations to condemn the Katanga secession in hopes of a
unified Congo state. Internationally led efforts were undertaken to restore the authority of the
45

Lemarchand, “Limits of Self-Determination,” 416
Ibid, 416.
47
Ibid, 416.
46

13

moderate and pro-western regime in Leopoldville over the entire country, in order to prevent an
aggressive, left-leaning state with Soviet backing in the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa.48
These external powers, although a major part of the secession’s demise, also provided the
resources for Moise Tshombe to initially declare the movement and solidify power. While it is
important to understand these complex relations between external powers and indigenous leaders
in Katanga, very little information displays the collective will of the people. Strong leaders
monopolized the media as well as the Katangese secessionist government. Their aims of great
power and wealth left their people without resources, economically or socially. Tshombe had
attempted to bring a unifying identity to the Katangese people in order to form a strong nation
yet he neglected the overall needs of the people, opting for wealth and power towards his own
family. This corrupt style of government which focuses on internal greed rather than the
common good has prevailed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Today, one of the most
minerally rich countries in the world is also one of the poorest and ethnic divisions remain a
large source of conflict. These deeply held loyalties -- qualities that often form the cultural,
social, and spiritual foundation for an individual -- may at times unify a community, but if
threatened, ethnic associations also have the power to rip apart communities as individuals strive
to preserve those qualities of life that are most important.
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